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Abstract
This article considers how Margaret Jane Radin’s theory of the feminist double bind 
can bring conceptual clarity to the difficulties feminisms face in engaging with polit-
ical and legal institutions of global governance. I draw on her theory to reinitiate a 
conversation on ideal and nonideal theory, in order to answer the call of key propo-
nents in international legal feminism to reevaluate methodologies in critiquing main-
stream institutions. By providing an account of how to navigate the double bind, this 
article brings conceptual clarity to the tension between resistance and compliance 
that has been argued to lie at the heart of the feminist project in international law. I 
demonstrate how this theoretical framework can foster greater pluralist perspectives 
in feminist engagement of ideal theories to temper the deradicalising and conserva-
tive risk of navigating feasibility constrained nonideal strategies.
Keywords Feminist methodology · International law · Resistance and compliance · 
Double bind · Ideal and nonideal theory · UN Security Council · Women, Peace and 
Security
Introduction
23 May 2008 Oñati to the Future
Is this a time when injury, suffering, indignity, symbolic, material violence, 
injustice, hunger, poverty are terms that conjure up times gone by? Is this a 
time of beautiful chaos?
Anonymous postcard to the Future (anonymous in Kouvo and Pearson 
[2011] 2014, 218)
The above quote forms one of many feminist ‘postcards to the future’ written by par-
ticipants of an academic workshop on feminist perspectives in the era of anxiety and 
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terror, which took place in Oñati, Spain in 2008. Not only does it convey the hope of 
the author for a beautiful future, but it invites next generation feminists to ask them-
selves whether they are living in “a time of beautiful chaos?” (Kouvo and Pearson 
[2011] 2014, 218).
It is timely to consider this question given prominent calls for a return to meth-
odology. Feminist Legal Studies, in particular, saw the successive publications of 
Dianne Otto and Anna Grear’s conversational article on international law, social 
change and resistance (2018), and Hilary Charlesworth, Gina Heathcote and Emily 
Jones’ inter-generational discussion concerning feminist scholarship on international 
law (2019). Both call for a methodological turn within international legal feminism, 
with the latter positing that now “seems the right time to return to theories and 
methodologies” (Charlesworth et al. 2019, 4). These are, to a degree, reflections that 
at once look back and take stock, and look forward speaking optimistically to future 
feminists. Time is, of course, an important aspect of how we should understand fem-
inist strategies of critical engagement and activism; it anchors feminist agreements 
and disagreements in a history of struggle and hope.
In responding to the call for methodological thinking, I will consider a funda-
mental problem international legal feminists face: a tension between engaging with 
international legal institutions and academic ‘mainstreams’, which exclude and 
devalue feminist contributions, on the one hand; or disengaging to pursue critique 
from the margins, on the other hand. I introduce, as a methodological intervention, a 
key contribution from Margaret Jane Radin’s writing on legal methodology, namely 
her theory of the feminist double bind (1990, 1699). Her compelling account of 
the bind captures the tension between nonideal strategies and ideal visions which 
loom large in feminist thought and activism. Despite thirty years since publication, 
I provide a novel application of Radin’s double bind to feminist epistemologies in 
international law. I show how it can be traced within patterns of international legal 
feminist argumentation, thereby situating these particular debates within wider femi-
nist conversations. The bind, I argue, offers evaluative theoretical tools and explicit 
temporality in navigating this tension. Finally, I depart from Radin to centre ideal 
thinking in my argument; I turn to conceptual debates within political philosophy to 
foreground this. In revealing the illuminative, instructive and radical potential of the 
theory of the double bind, a new analytic lens is offered to the feminist project on 
international law, as are tools for determining one’s own pathway through the pro-
ject’s most foundational tension.
For the purposes of clarity, I will briefly outline what I mean by the feminist dou-
ble bind. Radin’s theory of the double bind reveals that the implicit tension between 
resistance and compliance is the result of the non-ideal structures and institutions 
which demand compromising on feminist utopian ideals, leading to hegemonic 
forms of complicit feminisms at the expense of ‘Other’ feminisms and social jus-
tice projects. Radin observes that a double bind emerges when, in light of a particu-
lar feminist ethical question, two general routes emerge for addressing it. Engaging 
or disengaging, for example, are clear binary options which present themselves for 
feminists working on, or within, the mainstream. However, there are costs embedded 
within both of these strategies. Engagement has the potential to give rise to complic-
ity in the cooption of feminist ideas, or exclusion of much of the varied work that 
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constitutes the broad church of feminism. Yet disengagement runs the risk of los-
ing ‘progress’ previously gained, and perpetuating feminisms’ exclusion from main-
stream institutional action and academic thinking. Radin’s theory compels feminists 
to be explicit when weighing up non-ideal options, before making a temporary deci-
sion upon which to take. This decision is recognised as contingent, and continually 
open to reappraisal. Crucially, this is a self-reflective process, which begs for explicit 
engagement with the risks and shortcomings of feminist argumentation. This is how 
one might navigate nonideal options arising from nonideal circumstances. But under 
the theory of the double bind, feminists should also develop and advance ideal the-
ory, to foster the critical and revolutionary imaginings of feminisms. Exercising ide-
als protects feminists from operating solely in the realm of the nonideal, where revo-
lutionary visions become hostage to feasibility constraints. It embodies the type of 
beautiful chaos which departs from the existing status quo of disadvantage and vio-
lence, to oscillate between nonideal structures and ideal feminist utopian thinking.
To construct more thoroughly the ideas outlined above, I will follow four stages 
of argumentation. First, I will provide a brief exegesis of the current terrain of femi-
nist perspectives on international law. I will then introduce Radin’s theory of the 
double bind and show how it can be both a useful heuristic for framing and under-
standing this key tension, as well as a road map for navigating it. The third stage of 
the paper uses the United Nations Security Council as a case study for applying the 
double bind. Given the increasing, hegemonic militarism of the Council, in tandem 
with its Women, Peace and Security Agenda, it throws into relief this tension for 
feminisms. The final stage of the paper turns to consider some foreseeable objec-
tions a reader may pose to the arguments herein. I consider two potential objections 
I take to be most pressing: first, the paradox of addressing a binary tension through 
a dichotomous theoretical framework; and second, that the pragmatism of Radin’s 
double bind fosters a conservative approach to pursuing change. Radin goes some 
way in guarding against such objections, but I advance the defence by recentring 
ideal theory as an evaluative process. In so doing, I foreground more seriously the 
need to practise ideal theory through feminist plurality and radical thinking.
Feminist Pasts; Feminist Futures
I cannot do justice here to the rich multiplicity of feminist perspectives on interna-
tional law, which include postcolonial, critical race, queer, poststructuralist, intersec-
tional, and crip encounters with feminism. I will, however, provide a brief exegesis 
of some key moves within the literature to contextualise the tension between resist-
ance to, and compliance with, institutional and academic mainstreams (Kouvo and 
Pearson [2011] 2014). I will first outline the emergent methodological turn which 
motivates this paper, before offering an account of the diversity of feminist theories, 
and the revolutionary potential of their demands.
Since Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin and Shelley Wright’s ground-
breaking article in the American Journal of International Law (1991) feminist 
insights on international law have flourished, with 2018 marking, what I see as, 
the beginning of a methodological turn. Feminism(s) as analytical tools became 
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the focus of a number of important publications (see Harris Rimmer and Ogg 
2019; Heathcote 2019; Hodson and Lavers 2019; Kapur 2018), whilst other key 
proponents of the field more explicitly called for a renewed interest in feminist 
epistemologies. Dianne Otto and Anna Grear frame their appeal within a politi-
cal landscape marred by crisis discourses, the impervious nature of neoliberal 
capitalism and the continuation of colonial relations (2018, 351–353). Hilary 
Charlesworth, Gina Heathcote and Emily Jones consider the shifting ground of 
the international order and its fragmenting legal framework, observing how fem-
inist scholarship has adapted to it (Jones 2019, 1). Both conversations invite a 
recentring of feminist methodologies in international law, particularly in light of 
the inroads feminists have ostensibly made into the elite realm of international 
law and governance. Charlesworth, Heathcote and Jones note that:
Given the preliminary forays gender perspectives have made into the inter-
national institutions, it seems the right time to return to theories and meth-
odologies, to ask ourselves what the tools are that feminist approaches bring 
to international law, what are the tensions and what are the possibilities for 
feminist approaches to international law, beyond highlighting harm and dis-
crimination against women. (2019, 4)
Similarly, Otto and Grear stress the need to “work out how to revive the crucial 
elements of imagined feminist futures” (2018, 353).
Strikingly, both articles draw on the ongoing, historical struggle feminists 
have had in engaging with the academic and institutional mainstream structures 
of international law. Charlesworth et  al. discuss the concept of the mainstream 
in two ways. First, in terms of accessing academic and legal institutions, which, 
they argue, are structurally unaccommodating of the unfair distribution of car-
ing responsibilities women carry (2019, 13). This structural critique is buttressed 
by their normative, second point: the perceived irrelevancy of feminist analyses 
to the dominant work occurring within the mainstream. They note “feminists in 
international law are seen, by many, as scholars who work on sexual violence and 
representation alone” (2019, 8), thus their work is considered of little value out-
side of this silo.
Whilst Charlesworth et al. situate much of their critique and recommendations in 
past and present practice, Otto and Grear reveal how their respective visions of ideal 
feminist futures exist at odds with mainstream structures. In rescuing the emancipa-
tory and revolutionary goals of feminist thinking and imagining, they challenge the 
need feminists may feel to concede too much power in the law. However, this does 
not amount to turning away from the mainstream: “a feminist logic of social justice 
and peace needs to operate both outside and within the boundaries of international 
legal institutions, universities and other institutional fora” (2018, 361). The ques-
tion of how to navigate this tension has been a persistent thorn in the side of femi-
nists working in international law. Kouvo and Pearson have observed that the ten-
sion arises between resistance and compliance, which, they argue “is…built into the 
heart of the feminist project within international law” (Kouvo and Pearson [2011] 
2014, 5). Thus, the identity of the feminist working in, or on, international law is 
an uncertain one, and one which requires continual reconsidering and renegotiating.
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Critiques of feminist complicity with the mainstream’s cooption of some femi-
nist ideas, notably those most amenable to it, observe the exclusion of feminism’s 
more revolutionary demands, as well as feminist ‘Others’. In addressing mainstream 
cooption, reworking and advancing various feminist methodologies is key to ensur-
ing that engagement with feminism is substantiated with feminist meaning. Charles-
worth distinguishes between the rhetorical success of feminist messages in institu-
tions and the more revolutionary potential of feminist methods in international law 
([2011] 2014, 32). This distinction helps us to see the different depths of feminist 
analysis: the feminist messages are taken up at a surface level, but are susceptible 
to cooption and partial realisation whereas feminist methodologies are not taken up, 
but offer a deeper analysis and critique. Charlesworth argues that “feminist method-
ologies suggest that prescriptions of women’s equality must respond to the needs and 
desires of women we think we are helping” (Charlesworth [2011] 2014, 32). Thus, 
the task of reconsidering methods requires a serious engagement with the needs 
of those who feminism purports to advocate for. However, this raises a potentially 
problematic power imbalance between feminisms and those who feminists claim to 
advocate for, or as Janet Halley puts it, “carry a brief for” ([2006] 2008a, 5). As bell 
hooks makes clear, a feminism which assimilates with the mainstream may do so at 
the cost of other feminisms (1984, 3). It does so, she argues, by claiming to be the 
feminism for all women; a “hegemonic” version of feminism blind to the different 
lived experiences, suffering and strength of other feminisms (hooks 1984, 2).
The differences amongst and between feminist strands of thought and their 
demands are most strained when it comes to the encounters between feminism and 
the mainstream. As the former seeks to effect change on the latter, feminisms’ diver-
sity calls into question who is in the room, the price paid to be there, and who is left 
outside. Halley’s coining of ‘governance feminism’ (Halley et al. 2006, 2018, 2019) 
seeks to capture this by conveying the political influence of a particular type of femi-
nism within institutions of power, often at the expense of ‘Other’ feminisms (what 
Halley calls “divergent feminisms” ([2006] 2008a, 187)) which demand more than 
a monolithic, universalist feminist agenda. This throws into sharp relief the issue of 
feminism as an exercise of representation; both in the sense of political represen-
tation (speaking on behalf of X), and in the sense of depicting what that group is 
(Halley [2006] 2008a, 92). In terms of who is represented, Kimberlé Crenshaw has 
argued that “ignoring difference within groups contributes to tension among groups” 
(1991, 1242), stemming from the delineating effect of a feminism blind to intersec-
tional disadvantage. A black woman’s particular experience, for example, is often 
lost within social justice responses to either racism, or to sexism, which operate to 
frame them as exclusive categories (ibid). In a postcolonial feminist context, when 
Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak asked whether the subaltern could speak (1988), she 
revealed the complex way in which colonialism, race and gender weaved together 
particular manifestations of oppression. Spivak argued that the subaltern could not 
speak the language of the dominant mainstream, thus when feminism ‘speaks’ the 
language of the mainstream, it is unlikely to speak the language of subalternity. This 
is particularly pertinent given the critiques of (neoliberal) international law as an 
exercise in neocolonialism in its continuation of colonial relations (Kapur 2018, 19; 
Otto and Grear 2018, 351–353).
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What this brief account of some of the moves within feminism, broadly defined, 
reveals is that when the mainstream begins to consume (some) feminist ideas within 
it, the tension between resistance and compliance is heightened. In exchange for 
even marginal influence, feminism risks being ‘watered down’ and compromised, 
both in terms of the revolutionary spirit of its demands, and in terms of who it rep-
resents. Value, therefore, lies in the collective tolerance of the various priorities of 
feminisms. As Otto and Grear makes clear the feminist project requires “the capa-
cious visions and activism of feminists and other liberation movements outside the 
mainstream institutions of law and politics, as well as carving out spaces of resist-
ance and hopefulness on the inside” (2018, 361). This requires feminists to con-
sider seriously where they, as an individual, may fall. I will now demonstrate how 
Radin’s theory of the feminist double bind can be harnessed so that engagement or 
disengagement with mainstream structures can be pursued whilst celebrating plural-
ity and divergence.
Navigating the Feminist Double Bind
The tension over engaging with, or disengaging from, the mainstream is peppered 
throughout many key feminist critiques of international law. It is captured within 
binaries such as “power and danger” (Otto 2010, 97); “resistance and compli-
ance” (Kouvo and Pearson [2011] 2014, 1); “progressive development and danger-
ous gains” (Heathcote 2018, 374); “victory narratives and danger narratives” (Otto 
2014, 157). Whilst this language is effective in conveying a sense of opportunity 
and risk for the feminist project in international law, it tends to bracket off the spe-
cific tension relating to the international (institutional) order from wider feminist 
and emancipatory struggles. In keeping with the tone of feminist pasts and feminist 
futures, I will now look back at Margaret Jane Radin’s theory of the feminist double 
bind (1990, 1699) positing it as a methodological intervention for feminists caught 
within this tension. I see this theory as offering, not so much a substantive position 
on feminist engagement/disengagement with international legal institutions, but as 
a way of seeing the problem as shared across feminisms and social justice projects 
more broadly. I argue below that both a thin and thick methodological framework 
can be extrapolated from Radin’s theory of bind. The former provides a heuristic for 
identifying and framing the problem. One can commit to using the bind in this way 
alone or can build a more explicitly normative argument using the thick reading of 
the bind.
Locating Feminist Binds: A Thin Reading of Radin
In her 1990 article The Feminist and the Pragmatist, Radin outlines the core ten-
ets of the double bind which, she argues, continually troubles feminist analysis 
and prescription. The idea is relatively simple: that a particular feminist ethical 
problem or source of injustice may give rise to a number of solutions to solve or 
to mitigate it. In an ideal world, these solutions do not give rise to harm or risk 
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of harm, but given the particular social, political and economic context in which 
we find ourselves, they ultimately do expose us to risk. She argues that it is the 
nature of oppressive conditions that make feminist strategising fraught, and not 
necessarily the strategies in and of themselves. Paradoxically then, when the non-
ideal strategies available are either engaging with a dominant mainstream institu-
tion, or disengaging with it to pursue ideal theorising, the latter is still, in effect, a 
nonideal strategy as it is pursued in response to a nonideal state of affairs.
For the sake of clarity, I will briefly outline the case study that Radin uses 
to demonstrate the bind in action. She illustratively draws on the, often divisive, 
issue of sex work to reveal how, when faced with the binary question of legal-
istion (or decriminalisation) on the one hand, or criminalisation on the other, 
there is no clear, unified feminist solution. The former route she considers is the 
‘commodification’ prong of the bind, which carries the advantage of allowing sex 
workers to have full access to, and stronger rights within, the sexual and repro-
ductive market. This ensures that the monetary exchange benefits the ‘owners’ 
of the commodity being purchased, which is particularly pertinent given “the 
current feminisation of poverty and lack of avenues for free choice for women” 
(1990, 1700). However, Radin argues that this prong risks treating sex workers 
as fungible market commodities. The alternative ‘noncommodification’ prong 
presents similarly interconnected risks and opportunities. If sexual and reproduc-
tive capacities are not lawfully available as market commodities, this restricts the 
extent to which these capacities are treated as “severable fungible objects” (1990, 
1700). However, the threat that emerges from this is that women are denied the 
choice to market their sexual and reproductive services. For Radin, the dual harm 
which arises within these feminist strategies relate to existing harmful social 
conditions:
That commodification now tends toward fungibility of women and noncom-
modification now tends toward their domination and continued subordination 
are artifacts of the current social hierarchy. In other words, the fact of oppres-
sion is what gives rise to the double bind. (1990, 1700)
In this way, feminist strategic endeavors easily become rife with risk and backlash. 
Seeing that such risks result from nonideal and oppressive social, economic, mate-
rial, political and legal structures, the question of goal setting forces feminists to 
consider the extent to which these structures can constrain feminist thought and 
actions. I see this thin reading of Radin’s theory as offering an illuminating heuris-
tic: that feminist’s strategic divergence emerges from the prevailing dominant sexed, 
gendered, racial, classed and ableist hierarchies within legal institutions, and not 
necessarily feminist ideological divergence per se. This, in and of itself, goes some 
way in guarding against an impulse one may have to call for feminist uniformity and 
convergence (Halley [2006] 2008a, 187). Feminist strategic divergence and differ-
ence is not the source of the problem, but only appears problematic in light of domi-
nant mainstreams privileging some feminists and some demands. This process plays 
an important role in instilling a sense of hierarchy within feminism (establishing 
a ‘hegemonic’ feminism and its ‘Others’), illuminating how power operates within 
feminist encounters with the mainstream.
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Framing particular feminist tensions in such a way amounts, I argue, to a diagnos-
tic, descriptive practice that explicitly conveys the stakes, both in terms of risks and 
opportunity, when developing social justice and/or feminist strategies. I find one of 
the most compelling aspects of this theory lies in its concise framing of an observed 
pattern of risk and cost, traceable across all manner of social justice struggles 
against a shapeshifting mainstream. Whilst the risks may stem from power wielded 
by dominant structures, the bind, even as a diagnostic tool, commits feminists to 
explicitly outlining the risks or costs embedded within their nonideal strategies. This 
methodological framework compels sincere, critical self-reflection as the stakes are 
laid bare.
Radin’s theory of the double bind is a particular iteration of her feminist pragma-
tist methodology which she identified through, and honed within, much of her schol-
arship on contract law and property rights (see 1987, 1921–1923; 1995a, 140–145; 
1996, 123–130; 1999, 1158–1159; 2017, 354–356). I will not discuss here the poten-
tial implications of reading the theory of the bind through the lens of these, com-
mercial, transactional legal traditions.1 My aim here however is to demonstrate how 
a descriptive understanding of the feminist double bind sufficiently problematises 
power and agency in the relations between feminisms and the legal and academic 
mainstreams. I will now turn to consider the normativity underpinning Radin’s con-
tribution, thus offering a thick account of the double bind.
Proceeding with Feminist Binds: A Thick Reading of Radin
Radin does not just provide a descriptive observation on feminist ethical questions. 
She offers a pragmatically informed ‘way out’ of the bind by drawing on theories 
of nonideal and ideal justice. Having identified the potential strategies that could be 
taken in answering ethical questions for feminisms (e.g. commodification/noncom-
modification) one must assess which of the ‘prongs of the bind’ presents the least 
bad option. Importantly, the assessment should not be seen as conclusive nor fixed, 
but temporarily contingent upon nonideal circumstances which constrain the abil-
ity to realise ideals. Radin does not provide tools for how such assessments should 
take place nor does she provide an account of how we should understand ‘less bad’.2 
Rather, by not specifying a particular evaluative approach Radin leaves space for 
a plurality of methodologies and for the breadth of feminisms’ varying priorities 
and objectives. This space is key to seeing the value for feminisms in her theory, 
as it is one built on particularities, both of problems and of answers. No singular 
perspective can be wielded in solving feminist ethical questions. As Radin and 
Frank Michelman argue: “the field of legal thought contains – arguably – not one 
1 It is my sense that there is much to say on Radin’s use of the bind within her writing on (non)com-
modification and market (in)alienability in the context of international feminist legal methods. Indeed, it 
may be interesting, with market inalienability in mind, to consider whether the (neoliberal, neocolonial) 
international legal mainstream places conditions upon its encounters (transactions) with social justice 
theories. This would require, however, far greater attention than this paper allows for.
2 I return to discuss this in the context of pragmatism and coherence below.
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normativity, but many normativities” (1991, 1023). What is taken into account in 
assessing strategic options relates to the specific problem at hand and the various 
moving parts which shape it. A plurality of perspectives and normativities reveals 
varying pieces of truths (in terms of both problems and solutions).
Thus, there are two underlying theoretical streams embedded within Radin’s the-
ory: pragmatist-feminism on the one hand, and ideal/nonideal theory on the other. 
Both of these strands provide the normative principles which undergird the double 
bind. I will now address each in turn.
Pragmatist‑Feminism
The commitment to plurality within Radin’s theory speaks to her position as a prag-
matist legal theorist. In evoking the value of different theoretical insight, Radin 
positions the bind as a counter to unified grand theories which purport to hold the 
answer to feminist moral questions. In this way, Radin aims to consolidate an under-
lying commitment which she argues is common to both pragmatism and feminisms; 
namely embodiment and standpoint as sources of knowing and understanding the 
world (1990, 1707). The bind is an iterative process which reflects no singular Truth, 
but allows for piecemeal development, shaped by the multiple (re)evaluative and (re)
negotiating processes at play in the face of nonideal circumstances. For Radin this 
reveals similarities between pragmatist and feminist thought: “If feminists largely 
share the pragmatist commitment that truth is hammered out piecemeal in the cru-
cible of life and our situatedness, they also share the pragmatist understanding that 
truth is provisional and ever-changing” (ibid, 1707). The aim of this iterative pro-
cess is to ultimately dissolve the bind in its entirety (ibid, 1700). This would see 
the oppressive structures experienced by women, minoritised people, indigenous 
communities, members of the LGBTIQ+ communities, those with disabilities, indi-
viduals from the Global South, and those with intersecting factors of disadvantage, 
removed. More can be said of the pragmatist-feminism woven within the founda-
tions of Radin’s bind and I return to this in discussing objections below. I will now 
address the other theoretical paradigm within her work: ideal and nonideal theory.
Ideal and Nonideal Theory
The debt that is owed to theories of ideal and nonideal justice is made explicit in 
Radin’s account. Questions surrounding ideal theorising, in tandem with nonideal 
feasibility constraints, have been a recurring focus in political philosophy (see Rawls 
[1971] 1999, 216; Sen 2006; Cohen 2008). Considering this in depth is beyond 
the scope of this paper. However, the very concise framing of this problem in the 
space of international law as one of ideal/nonideal tension may offer a much-needed 
prompt to habitually return to the foundations of feminist ethical dilemmas. Laura 
Valentini (2012) takes stock of the methodological turn in the political philosophy 
literature, a turn prompted, she argues, by the “frustration with the subject’s per-
ceived lack of influence in real world politics” (2012, 654). She provides a typology 
of ideal and nonideal justice theories, mapping three interpretations: (i) full compli-
ance versus partial compliance theory; (ii) utopian versus realistic theory; and (iii) 
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end-state versus transitionary theory (ibid). Whilst Radin’s theory of the bind pre-
dates Valentini’s typology, the bind is best interpreted as falling within the last of 
these categories, as Radin sees nonideal justice as informed by ideal theories so that 
“we know what we are trying to achieve” (1990, 1701). This is not to say that she 
does not touch upon the utopian versus realistic interpretations. She articulates the 
bind as a problem of transition, thus the steps taken in light of feasibility are in aid 
of dissolving the bind in its totality. It is worth noting that there is no clear distinc-
tion in Radin’s conceptualisation of the bind between utopian versus realistic theory 
and end-state versus transitionary theory, but it is clear that her normative position 
emerges from prioritising nonideal justice (transitionary) actions, whilst noting the 
contingent nature of ideal justice. Thus, ideals are not fixed under her theorising 
but evolve alongside the nonideal steps we take. In this vein, Radin argues that “our 
visions and nonideal decisions, our theory and practice, paradoxically constitute 
each other” (1990, 1701).
There is much that can be gained in considering Radin’s diagnosis of the double 
bind as a helping theorem in considering the tension at the heart of the feminist 
project in international law. The strategic options of either engaging with interna-
tional institutions (whilst bearing the risk of cooption) or disengaging to apply pres-
sure from the margins (whilst risking the continuation of exclusion), are the options 
thrown up by an oppressive, androcentric international order. They are the nonideal 
measures, loaded with both opportunity and risk, which are juggled with feminist 
utopias. One does not have to look far to see international legal feminists evoking 
this way of thinking. Otto’s commitment to “juggling critique with hope” (Engle 
2017; Otto 2016, 295) enabled her to be critical of the law as is, whilst simultane-
ously advancing hope for a new legal order. To echo Karen Engles’ question: “how 
else might we imagine peace and the decolonisation of minds and bodies other 
than by attempting to unravel the knowledge that binds us”? (2017, 122). Thus, the 
ordered chaos of reflexivity and the continual suspension of concluded answers to 
moral questions embedded within Radin’s framework speaks to the methods used by 
international legal feminists. It holds both ideal and nonideal considerations in mind 
as one navigates the tensions within, and outside of, a system built on inclusions and 
exclusions.
I will now show the relevancy of Radin’s theory of the double bind for the femi-
nist project in international law by using the UN Security Council, and it’s supposed 
uptake of feminist ideals, as a case study.
Applying the Bind to the UN Security Council
Feminist tensions over mainstream (dis)engagement is most acute in the context of 
the Security Council given its “hegemonic reach” (Otto 2009, 12). The Council is 
the focus of a rich body of cross-disciplinary feminisms: from international law, to 
international relations, security studies, to institutional studies (see Cockburn 2007; 
Cohn et al. 2004; Davies 2019; Davies and True 2019; Heathcote 2011; Kirby and 
Shepherd 2016; Otto 2017; Thomson 2018). I will now outline some of the femi-
nist concerns which have arisen over pursuing social justice objectives through 
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the Council. I primarily consider the ‘Women, Peace and Security Agenda’ (WPS) 
before demonstrating how the double bind captures much of this critique.
Women, Peace and Security
Since the Security Council established the WPS through resolution (UNSCR) 1325 
(2000), feminist strategies in relation to the Council have been particularly vibrant. 
The WPS, as a thematic agenda, outlines a normative framework to be operational-
ised within other streams of the Council’s work, such as its country-specific agendas 
and its peacekeeping mandates (Dornig 2014, 1). In UNSCR 1325 the Council out-
lines its previous efforts to address the experiences of women in conflict and post-
conflict settings, however, the substance of UNSCR 1325 marks an important shift 
in the Council’s engagement with feminist ideas. It observes not only the differential 
impact of conflict on the premise of gender, but also the important contribution of 
women and girls in peace processes, alongside the need to advance their status and 
position within society in post conflict settings.
Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins summarise the fundamental principles laid 
down in resolution 1325 as:
(1) that gender inequality (in social, economic, and political power) is linked to 
insecurity; and (2) that successfully preventing, resolving, and rebuilding after 
conflict requires both women’s participation and the incorporation of gender-
equality concerns, in local, national, and international processes. (Goetz and 
Jenkins 2018, 119).
These principles can be seen as part of a wider ambition of the UN to obtain gender 
equality.3 This is particularly so given the increasing links made between women’s 
subjugation, and continuing instability and conflict (UN Committee for the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 2013; UN Security Council 
2000a, b, c).
The creation of this agenda has been celebrated by those who pressed for a more 
gender-sensitive Security Council (Otto 2009, 11). The reach of feminist messages 
could now be considered prolific: influencing the ultimate hegemonic, masculine 
organ of the UN. Otto argues that this hard-fought achievement saw feminist ‘gains’ 
such as: the recognition of “women as full subjects of international law” (2009, 15); 
a feminist foothold for further progress; and the opportunity to politically organise 
feminist networks, both internationally and locally “creating constituencies outside 
institutional control” (ibid). Such observations form a part of her “victory narra-
tive”, a term she uses in reflecting on her past analytic style of tracing the develop-
ments of WPS resolutions (Otto 2014, 158). This victory narrative stands in contrast 
to her “danger narrative” (ibid), which speaks to the cooption of feminist ideals. The 
3 The importance of gender equality is stressed in a number of different UN legal instruments, including, 
inter alia, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; the International Covenant of Economic, Cultural and Social Rights; and the Convention of the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women.
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weak (or lacking) enforcement mechanisms around the agenda, the perpetuation of 
protectee (feminine)/protector (masculine) stereotypes, and the selective adoption 
of feminist ideals, amongst other shortcomings of the WPS, reveal the costs to the 
feminist project in international law (Otto 2010, 157). Otto has more recently noted 
that there has been “little feminist debate about the wisdom of engagement with 
the patently undemocratic and secretive Security Council, the seat of power of the 
world’s superpower(s), whose permanent members are also the world’s largest arms 
dealers” (Otto 2014, 158).
The manner in which Otto has framed the problem is a clear indicator of the 
feminist double bind at work. By reading her analysis in light of the feminist dou-
ble bind, even in the thin sense, the strengths of Otto’s work is enhanced and more 
vividly brought to the surface. The costs of engaging or disengaging with the Coun-
cil are seen as near unavoidable for the feminist, given the background structure of 
the Council’s hegemonic bargaining power, and those costs are made clear, foster-
ing self-reflection and accountability. However, the inverse benefits are also made 
explicit. Given that the bind embeds nonideal and ideal thinking, it is expected 
under this methodological framework that different feminist perspectives draw on 
their ideal, theoretical standpoints to weigh up the nonideal options (the risks and 
potential benefits). The value of different actors pursuing different routes is made 
more visible, thus, feminist divergence and plurality is clearly seen as sources of 
strength for the international legal feminist project. I will now briefly examine some 
of the ideal theories at work in feminist thought, more specifically on the Council. In 
so doing, I will demonstrate how engaging with a thick reading of the double bind 
theory can further feminisms’ objectives with the Council in mind.
Unobtained Feminist Ideals at the Security Council
Shared across the differing strands of feminism lies a commitment to normativity; a 
tradition which prioritises ethical and political claims as to how the world should be 
(Srinivasan 2015, 8). Normative ideals, however, are frequently lost or frustrated by 
feminist encounters with the mainstream. In this way, the histories of feminist strug-
gles are littered with unobtained ideals. By discussing some unobtained ideals of 
feminisms concerning the Council, I do not seek to promote any particular ideal: it is 
of course difficult to not explicitly endorse the ideals of peace and equality, but there 
are various interpretations of precisely what peace and equality require, amongst 
which I seek to remain neutral (at least here). The rationale for this approach is to 
provide a frame of reference for the compromises that feminists have made in their 
interactions with the Council.
These very compromises (or “gains” (Heathcote 2018, 374)) build on, and mir-
ror, the early fault lines carved during the creation of the WPS. Sara Davies and 
Jacqui True note two underlying tensions with the agenda, the first being the active 
engagement “with political and economic institutions in order to transform power 
relations – the very institutions that have marginalised women’s representation and 
livelihoods” (2018). The other tension they observe is that the WPS “has its roots 
in anti-war women’s movements” (ibid), marking a sharp distinction from what we 
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see happening with the agenda now: the promotion of mainstreaming gender per-
spectives within military activities and peacekeeping missions (ibid). The early driv-
ers of peace and anti-militarism underpinned the Women’s International League 
of Peace and Freedom (WILPF) (and the coalition of NGOs which it assembled) 
efforts to “persuade the Council to adopt a more feminist agenda” (Otto 2018, 107). 
The initial drafts of the resolution, compiled by this collection of feminist advocates 
reflected this: centring gender provisions within mandates; strengthening women’s 
existing legal protection and pursuing gender perspectives within Disarmament, 
Demobilisation and Reintegration programmes; alongside supporting women’s local 
peace building efforts (Cohn et al. 2004, 131–132). However, the resolution which 
was finally adopted, whilst hailed as groundbreaking, has been criticised for being a 
watered-down version of WILPF and the NGO coalition’s vision (Cockburn 2007, 
147). In the compromise of the encounter with the Council, the resolution failed to 
take seriously ending cycles of conflict, or women’s role in preventing them (ibid). 
The ideals of peace and anti-militarism are now clearly seen as at odds with the tra-
jectory of the agenda (Otto 2018, 107). Otto observes how many of the WPS resolu-
tions do not limit the “justifications for the use of arms” but instead “provide a new 
trigger for the collective use of force, particularly when sexual violence is used as a 
“tactic of war”” (Otto 2018, 111).4
However, this does not mean that WILPF now rejects the Council’s limited femi-
nist vision. On the contrary, the WPS is used by the organisation as a platform for 
pushing greater reform. In recognition of the 15th-year anniversary of the WPS, 
WILPF issued a report which, inter alia, highlighted four of its “demands” to the 
Council (WILPF 2015, 3). Most relevant to this discussion is its third demand: call-
ing for the “stigmatisation of militarism/war…shedding light on the political econ-
omy of militarisation” (ibid). This demand very clearly speaks to the ‘peace’ com-
ponent of women, peace and security, whilst simultaneously noting the structural 
obstacle posed to this by a political climate whereby conflict holds currency.
There are, of course, varying degrees of ideals pursued across feminisms. Otto 
and Grear have most clearly demonstrated this, with Otto arguing that her ideal of 
“perpetual feminist peace” is a modest goal in contrast to Grear’s objectives (2018, 
353). In her work Grear challenges the ‘Anthropocene’ (Otto and Grear 2018, 
353–355) and seeks to disrupt the judicially privileged centrality of human agency, 
which she argues facilitates legally constructed hierarchies, exiling “non-European 
‘others’, feminised others, queer and ‘irrational’ others, including the indigenous 
– but also the ‘animal’” (ibid). Not only does this conversation demonstrate the very 
different versions of a feminist utopia that exist, but it reveals the extent to which 
feminist objectives are frustrated through any efforts to channel these aims through 
the non-ideal mechanisms of international, inter-State institutions. For Otto, sim-
ply fusing frames of “peace” to frames of “security” (which is clearly visible in the 
very name of the Council’s WPS) can only lead to a “dirty” and militarised form of 
peace, and perpetual cycles of conflict and insecurity (Otto 2018, 115). Similarly, 
Heathcote, amongst others, has argued that the recent merging of the WPS with the 
4 The Security Council resolutions Otto refers to here are: 1820 (2008); 1888 (2009) and 1960 (2010).
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Council’s counter-terrorism framework underlines why the institution cannot be 
seen as a space for progressing the feminist agenda (2018, 375; Chowdhury Fink 
and Davidian 2018, Ní Aoláin 2016). Heathcote notes that the continued silence 
of the Council on its increasing record of authorisations of military action, and its 
silence on the complicity of UN peacekeeping missions in the sexual exploitation 
and abuse of women and girls, raises important questions as to the Council’s femi-
nist credentials (2018, 375). In these conversations, the underlying tension between 
nonideal feasibility constraints and ideal theorising, upon which the double bind 
rests, can be traced. Radin’s theory has the virtue of bringing into particularly sharp 
focus the trap of engaging with, or disengaging from, the mainstream and offers a 
structure for furthering these conversations.
The Bind in Action
I will now map out, more specifically, how the bind applies to the UN Security 
Council. I will show how the bind as a methodological tool enables feminists to 
explicitly contextualise available strategies and the risks embedded within them. 
This explicit contextualisation guards against pursuing strategies uncritically or in 
an unreflective way. It embeds a critical pragmatism within feminist thinking, and a 
humble acceptance of the contingency of feminist knowledges upon the individuals 
situated temporal world views.
The strategic options available when it comes to the Council have long been dis-
cussed. Otto most clearly captures them by pointing to the tension between celebrat-
ing the positive wins of engagement on the one hand and warning of danger on the 
other (2010; 2017). Should feminists be pursuing a narrow form of ‘victory’ and 
‘power’ or should they be resisting this? (Otto 2014). Are they even required to com-
ment on this tension, and their position in relation to it, within their analysis? This 
tension has become so entrenched within parts of the feminist consciousness that 
it is seen as important to not only recognise it, but to also nail one’s colours to the 
mast. In Tamsin Phillipa Paige’s recent analysis of Security Council debates on sex-
ual violence she explores the lens of heteronormativity (2018). Emily Jones, whilst 
remarking on the strength in Paige’s normative stance on inclusivity outside of the 
heteronormative matrix, notes her silence on the overarching tension (Jones 2019, 
117). Jones argues that the analysis “leaves the reader wondering what the author’s 
own stance is, [given] the background debates on feminist and queer alliances with 
security inherently framing the structure of inclusion and exclusion” (ibid). Clarify-
ing whether you target your critique and your normative contributions towards the 
mainstream or the margins is therefore key. To do so, whilst using the double bind as 
a theoretical framework, reveals an awareness of the nonideal nature of your choice.
The double bind allows feminists to see both engaging and disengaging as the 
nonideal strategies which have been made available to them by an exclusionary 
and oppressive structure. The choices that are made do not exculpate the source of 
this structural violence. Having a choice does, however, place a responsibility on 
feminists to evaluate the options and to determine which is the least bad. María 
Martín de Almagro work demonstrates the racial, classist, heteronormative and 
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Western-centric structure of the WPS through a postcolonial analysis of national 
action plans (2018). She shows that when the WPS is instrumentalised at the 
national level, particular subject positions relating to gender, race, and class become 
normalised and fixed in a hierarchical way, embedding inequalities (2018, 404). Yet 
to abandon the framework of the WPS may perpetuate the exclusion that the under-
pinning feminist aspirations of the agenda sought to counter. These risks frame the 
nonideal nature of the strategies available, tying them to the overarching structures 
of the exclusionary nature of dominant mainstreams. With this knowledge, having 
taken Martín de Almagro analysis on board, a feminist subject can choose whether 
to engage with the Council (seeing it as having the potential to upend such hierar-
chies) or disengage (seeing it as conserving, rather than tackling, the status quo). 
The explicit nature of the bind embeds accountability and self-reflection in the pro-
cess of weighing up which nonideal option is the least bad. Importantly though, 
this decision should be knowingly flexible, with any final judgment suspended. To 
engage with the double bind in a thick way, the theory compels working on both 
ideal and nonideal theorising alongside each other. This fuels the coevolution of 
“our institutions, our ideals and ourselves” (Radin 1995b, 1600), enabling the bet-
terment of the institutions, and therefore the nonideal options available, as feminists 
outgrow their situated insights and critiques (ibid, 1599).
Challenges
This paper has shown how Radin’s work on the double bind offers a valuable meth-
odological insight to the fundamental tension at the heart of international legal femi-
nisms. I will now consider two possible objections to the arguments which I have 
advanced: first, that it may entrench binary thinking within international feminism; 
and second, that the pragmatism drawn on may diminish radical and revolution-
ary feminist ambitions. I will do so by drawing on some of Radin’s own defences 
embedded within her work, whilst enhancing them in light of recent trajectories of 
feminisms.
Binds and Binaries
Potentially the most obvious cause for objection is the very bind at the core of my 
argument. It may be questioned whether a binary can be dissolved in the process 
of centring binary tensions such as resistance and compliance, and engagement 
and disengagement. As feminists we tend to find ourselves concerned by reduc-
tive binaries, such as the public/private divide, which funnel all of life’s com-
plexity into one category or another (Lacey 1993, 94; Charlesworth and Chinkin 
2000, 49–50). We rally against the simplistic construction of gender as either 
man or woman, male or female, and we attempt to release the straitjacket of pre-
scriptive and proscriptive legal norms constructed around seemingly watertight 
categories of lived experiences (Lacey 1993, 103–107; Drakopoulou 2000, 200; 
Heathcote 2019, 3). Thus, any theory which appears to prescribe binary thinking 
194 F. Bird 
1 3
as offering an answer may raise alarm bells for those with feminist intuitions. 
The binary thinking embedded within Radin’s original piece may be thought to 
simplify a number of complex issues, reducing the potential feminist responses to 
two, e.g. commodification/noncommodification; resistance/compliance; engage-
ment/disengagement. This may be considered unsatisfactory, with binary options 
seeming crude and reductive. Radin does not explicitly consider such an objec-
tion, however, I have extrapolated two defences built into her argument. The first 
concerns the dissolution of the bind, and the second is rooted in her general argu-
ments on feminist and pragmatist thought.
Turning to consider the first defence, Radin appears to address the potentially rei-
fying effects of describing binds by using prescriptive reasoning: that is, by advanc-
ing a normative framework for what to do when a bind is identified. Radin argues 
that the bind does not need solving, but dissolving (1990, 1700). I see the two prongs 
of action Radin identifies for doing so as the pathways thrown up by a legal sys-
tem built on the assumption of unified, masculine subjects (Drakopoulou 2000, 200; 
Kapur 2005; Heathcote 2019, 96–102) which are seen to navigate a world divided 
between legality and illegality, regulated and unregulated (Lacey 1993, 94). The law 
brings to life a world of binary options. Feminists are therefore faced with a decision 
between adopting the tools of the law to ‘fix’ moral questions, or to turn their backs 
on this framework, and build critique which rejects the law as holding the answer. 
Even when there appears to be more than two options, they will often share struc-
tural features which make it useful to categorise them as under one of two headings. 
For example, there may be various ways in which we engage with the mainstream 
or operate from the margins, in the same way that the approaches to legal regulation 
may be varied. However, such options are still captured within the binary terms of 
engagement or disengagement with the legal processes wielded by the mainstream. 
It is because of this structuring process that feminists find themselves faced with 
simplistic, nonideal binds which obscure the diversity of experience and push sub-
jectivities to the peripheries (Kapur 2005, 3).
The dissolution of the bind is, of course, an end goal, but a critic may still 
see this as an insufficient justification for the process of describing such binds. 
Such a practice may be more damaging than not, serving to (re)constitute binds 
and therefore entrench inequality. This is the risk of appearing to hold on to, 
and maintain, outsider status from the mainstream through feminist description. 
Paradoxically, through describing feminist problems as such, the ‘ghettoisation’ 
of ‘women’s issues’ is maintained (Bianchi 2016, 201). In many ways, this is 
a cost of the nonideal measure of describing problems: feminisms may indeed 
contribute to reifying them. Herein lies the fundamental challenge for feminist 
and social justice projects in describing the world as is alongside developing a 
normative account for how the world should be (Srinivasan 2020, 39; Srinivasan 
2015). Radin’s theory commits feminists to being explicit in the nonideal nature 
of their binary options, but this thin reading of the bind centres on the task of 
description. Of course, feminists, in addressing a problem, need to be able to see 
it and name it before doing so. In outlining the commodification/noncommodi-
fication bind, Radin engages in the same practice as Kouvo and Pearson ([2011] 
2014) in outlining the compliance/resistance bind. So how can the potential 
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damage of description be squared with revolutionary end goals which upend 
the hierarchies which feminism may be accused of partly constituting through 
description?
This is where Radin’s work on anti-normative critique (poststructuralism), 
feminism and pragmatism can be useful. In drawing on the similarities between 
feminism and more traditional modes of pragmatism (such as those espoused by 
William James and John Dewey), Radin observes that both commit to the disso-
lution of traditional dichotomies, and the methodology of consciousness raising 
as a way out of inequality and oppression (1990, 1707–1708). Description here 
can be read as communicating “shared meaning out of shared interactions with 
the world” (ibid, 1708). For Radin, pragmatism and feminism alike “must make 
communication possible where before there was silence” (ibid). Thus, describ-
ing feminist ethical problems is an advance upon ignorance of one’s own exclu-
sion. However, even in this defence, the bind appears to be at play, simmering 
under the surface. Speaking, as describing, and not speaking at all is dichoto-
mous: these options could be categorised as engagement/disengagement. The 
pragmatic line of thinking in Radin’s bind suggests that feminists cannot do the 
impossible and insists upon bracketing off fundamental tensions. For example, 
she argues that “conventional femininity”, marked as traditional exclusion from 
the masculine world of public institutions, “is where we start, it is what we have 
to work with” (Radin and Michelman 1991, 1051). Part of the feminist process 
is “the watchful receptiveness to redescription. It is the cultivated understanding 
that all our old descriptions of the world are always open to progressive change” 
(ibid).
A further way to defend against this critique is to deemphasise the conceptual 
split between description and normativity. If describing binds is problematic, it is 
helpful to consider the subtle prescription within, even the most straightforward 
of descriptive utterances. Whilst I have argued that there is both a thin and thick 
reading that can be extrapolated from the feminist double bind, these categorisa-
tions are rough approximations. It is not that descriptive or normative work is 
all that they are doing, but more where the emphasis of them lies. Ostensibly the 
normative component sees the feminist as advancing alternative realities to the 
bind, it compels an explicit engagement with ideal theory, but to a lesser degree 
so too does the descriptive component of the bind. In writing on the anti-norma-
tivity pursued by some forms of legal positivism, Radin and Michelman deny the 
possibility of separating communicative acts such as description, normativity (or 
prescription) and criticism (1991, 1027). For them, communication delivers an 
argument, even implicitly, for how one should see the world. They argue there 
is “no non-normative utterance. There are only kinds and degrees of normativ-
ity” (ibid). Amia Srinivasan similarly troubles the supposed value-free descrip-
tive processes valued in mainstream philosophical enquiry. She argues that femi-
nist philosophy is simply more explicit about the inseparability of descriptive and 
prescriptive inquiry, as she charges mainstream philosophers with “pursu[ing] 
prescriptive project[s] under the guise of descriptive one[s]” (2015, 14). Thus, 
even the more descriptive aspect of framing double binds embeds a normativity 
that works against the bind itself.
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Coherence, Conservatism and Ideal Thinking
The second objection I consider relates to the bind’s reliance upon pragmatic rea-
soning. A critic may harbour reservations surrounding the potentially conservative 
nature of this theoretical tradition, particularly in contrast to the more revolutionary 
and critical tenets of international legal feminisms. It is worth noting that conveying 
the wider corpus of feminist-pragmatist thought is beyond the scope of this paper. 
What I address here are those issues directly relevant to the double bind. Whilst this 
theory is entangled within the pragmatic tradition, it would be too quick to inter-
pret the arguments herein as a call for a wholesale adoption of feminist-pragmatist 
method. Future research which considers, for example, the contemporary contri-
bution of Black feminist pragmatist theorising (see James and Busia 1993; James 
2009), or feminist reinterpretations of classic pragmatic writings of Dewey and Jane 
Addams (see Fischer 2000; James 2017), could consider such questions. In regard 
to conservatism, Radin herself demonstrates how to avoid such an interpretation of 
the bind and I will address this in the first instance before expanding on how ideal 
theory can further guard against this.
Conservative Pragmatism
There is still the question of determining which prong of the bind is the least bad. 
Whilst Radin remains relatively open on this, she introduces a particular criterion 
for making value judgments: coherence, both in terms of conceptual coherence and 
institutional coherence (1990, 1705). However, such a yardstick may prevent efforts 
to effect radical change. By ‘coherence’, Radin refers to the way in which pragmatist 
theories have conceived of truth and knowledge: that they emerge in a piecemeal 
way from situated experiences (1990, 1707). She further explains that “when we are 
faced with new experiences and new beliefs, we fit them into our web [of knowl-
edge and truth] with as little alteration of what is already there as possible” (1990, 
1709). When faced with two nonideal options, such an understanding of truth dis-
counts the option which looks less like the coherent system that we currently have. 
Thus, a pragmatist may place more value on the nonideal path which alters the web 
of knowledge the least. Feasible options under the ‘compliance’ prong hold greater 
weight under this model of evaluation for being more readily accommodated into 
the mainstream. This is notably a conservative method and is particularly unsatisfac-
tory in the case of ‘bad coherence’, where a coherent system of belief exists but it is 
marked by domination and oppression (Radin 1990, 1710). The paradoxical ques-
tion for Radin is “how can the pragmatist find a standpoint from which to argue that 
a system is coherent but bad, if pragmatism defines truth and good as coherence?” 
(1990, 1710).
In the context of legal governance structures, a conservative approach to coher-
ence which privileges strategies that fit in with institutional values, customs and 
principles may prevail over more radical, revolutionary strategies by virtue of their 
feasibility. For the conservative pragmatist, gender mainstreaming may appear less 
bad in that it offers institutional coherence. In this way, the bind works to main-
tain the existing status quo. An international legal system which is coherently 
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exclusionary will attract, in the search for continued coherence, strategies that offer 
only partial, limited inclusion, while maintaining exclusionary practices. What this 
means, Radin notes, is that “for the oppressed…the status quo must change very 
slowly, if at all” (1990, 1722). This may be too unsatisfactory for those approaching 
the problem from more revolutionary and radical viewpoints.
Radin does go some way in offering a solution for the pragmatist-feminist. She 
argues “[they] must find a way that ‘the law’ can be understood to include the con-
ceptions of the oppressed as they are coming to be, even if the weight of legal insti-
tutions coherently excludes them” (1990, 1721). Radin argues that releasing the 
chains of conservative, institutional coherence can be achieved through listening to 
the perspectives of disadvantaged or oppressed groups and allowing more give to the 
embedded plurality in legal interpretation (ibid; 1724–1725). Legal processes are 
inherently pluralist: from advocacy, to drafting, to interpretation, individuals may 
come to different conclusions as to how to affect law. The “critical spirit of pragma-
tism” (ibid, 1725) lies in the fostering of marginal voices within legal procedures, 
much like the critical spirit of feminisms. Such thinking can be uncovered from the 
surface of international legal feminist analysis of the WPS. The footholds of feminist 
engagement, Otto argues, stem from the concrete (albeit precarious) legal inroads 
of the Security Council’s WPS (2010, 120). This allows for the continual interpret-
ing and reinterpreting of legal norms from various theoretical perspectives which 
can effectively disrupt patterns of institutional coherence which maintain exclusion. 
The critical spirit of the double bind, therefore, can only be realised when critical 
insights are advanced. Feminisms are rich sources of such insight. Through their 
divergent plurality and elevating of peripheral subjectivities, feminisms are acutely 
embedded within, what Otto calls, the “politics of listening” (Otto 2017; Heathcote 
2019, 194).
This may not wholly guard against conservative assumptions of the pragmatic 
underpinnings of the bind. The conceptualisation of the bind as a continual, reoc-
curring choice between two nonideal conditions may appear to present nonideal jus-
tice as an inevitability; as the feminist’s ‘lot’. When this is paired with coherence 
as a pragmatic evaluative yardstick, there could be concern that the bind’s pluralist 
critical spirit may all to easily be overrun in the context of a legal tradition which 
holds institutional cohesion at its core. Maria Grahn-Farley has raised concern 
over a strand of feminist thinking which lends itself to the “politics of inevitabil-
ity” (Grahn-Farley [2011] 2014, 109; Halley 2008b). Grahn-Farley criticises Hal-
ley for using agency theory “as a way for the individual to make peace with her 
lot by willingly accepting the oppressive effects of the institution” ([2011] 2014, 
121). Victimhood is diminished under this account. She goes on to argue that when 
oppression is taken as inevitable, and is legitimised by theories which aim to under-
mine the victim’s status by demonstrating their ability to choose, “agency theory, 
as it passes through the politics of inevitability, becomes a new form of sexism and 
anti-feminism” (ibid). The bind rests on an assumption that the feminist is able to 
exercise choice in which nonideal option to take. The feminist, having freedom 
to choose between engaging or disengaging with legal institutional and academic 
mainstreams, is read as privileged and should be thankful for being given options. 
However, this attributes too much to agency theory, obscuring the degree and effect 
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of mainstream, institutional exclusion on feminists. Such an interpretation fetishises 
the limited movement available to the feminist. To guard against this, one needs to 
look to ideal theory to demand better options.
Pursuing Ideal Feminisms
Centring ideal theories and feminist commitments whilst navigating the double 
bind is key to ensuring that nonideal considerations and ideal imaginings contin-
ually speak to each other, coevolve and effect fundamental change on the various 
mainstreams. To do this, I stress a departure from imagining fixed, external utopian 
worlds, and instead adopt utopian thinking in using the double bind. I understand 
utopian thinking as a cyclical process of using ideal theory as a means to evaluate 
nonideal options. In this way, normative principles are used to assess nonideal reali-
ties, which in turn hone the normative principles developed. This process mitigates 
the bifurcation of ideal theory from nonideal realities: where on the one hand there 
is a utopian world of both “no place” and the “good place” (Cooper 2014, 5), and on 
the other hand, a realist world of feasibility constraints.
Returning to Valentini’s taxonomy of ideal and nonideal theories (2012), it is a 
reminder of Radin’s double bind being a “a problem of transition” (1990, 1701). 
This positions her work firmly within the ‘end-state vs. transitionary’ interpretation 
of ideal/nonideal theory. Under this understanding, ideal theories develop normative 
principles for the ‘end-state’, whilst nonideal thinking tells one how to achieve this 
end-state gradually. However, as I outlined above, Radin’s theory also strays into 
Valentini’s utopian versus realist forms of theorising. Drawing on the work of G. A. 
Cohen, Valentini reveals how this conceptual framing places less emphasis on the 
normative aspect of the ideal prong, and more on its evaluative potential (2012, 5; 
Cohen 2003; 2008). The utopian versus realist framing is less concerned with devel-
oping rules on what one should do, and more concerned with how one should think 
(Valentini 2012, 5; Gilabert 2011, 58), and in particular, how to determine whether 
something is good or bad.
The evaluative potential of utopian thinking guards against conservative prag-
matism as it moves us away from imagining utopias and normative principles 
which are overly responsive to the feasibility constraints of the world as is. Davina 
Cooper warns against developing normative concepts which emerge from, and are 
thus grounded in, the established mainstream (2014, 29). She argues that this ren-
ders them “stuck” with the effects of dominant practices (2014, 29). To refer back to 
Radin’s web analogy of pragmatic coherence, ideals are like butterflies: vulnerable 
to the sticky spider web of institutional practice. The task of evaluation exists in 
the space between the imaginings of ideals and the sticky feasibility constraints of 
actualisation (Cooper 2014, 13). Anca Gheaus posits that prescriptive or normative 
claims invoke the “ought implies can” principle (2013, 457). She argues for a con-
ception of justice which is detached from feasibility but still responsive to the pre-
vailing state of affairs: “while issues of feasibility are relevant to limiting the scope 
of agent’s duties, they are not relevant to determining the content of the concept of 
justice” (2013, 449). She draws on Pablo Gilabert’s distinction between normativity 
and evaluations arguing that the former is contingent upon feasibility whereas the 
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latter is not (2013, 447; Gilabert 2011). Thus, when feminists evaluate international 
legal institutions they can do so in relation to feminist ideals as evaluative yardsticks. 
This is even as they navigate the feasibility constrained bind of nonideal options. 
Institutional coherence may be a valuable yardstick for, say, conservative versions of 
pragmatism, but it is unlikely to be a valuable yardstick for a more critical pragma-
tist, or a revolutionary feminist. Ideal theorising provides space to develop evalua-
tive tools and refine the values which are used to call for change. In this way one can 
“consider further strategies of reconstruction (and disruption) within the structures 
of the global order” (Heathcote 2016, 133) whilst managing ideal visions and non-
ideal realities. Such management embeds a practice of oscillation within feminisms 
from the feasibility constraints of the nonideal circumstances, to the revolutionary 
realm of the ideal, etching out, along the way, the coevolution and betterment of 
these prongs.
Conclusion
The historical tension at the heart of feminisms, and other social justice theories, 
in their interactions with institutions of power is seemingly an ever-vexing issue to 
which international legal feminism is not immune. Key proponents in the field have 
called for a return to our methodological processes, and in answering this call, I 
have argued for the need to stop and take stock of where we have been and where 
we plan on going in our various feminist futures. In considering whether we are 
living in a time of ‘beautiful chaos’, I turned to the work of Radin to conceptualise 
a way to foster plurality in managing guilt and expectations of nonideal strategies. 
As one struggles over how to see oneself, as a feminist using the tools of traditional 
doctrinal analysis and legal argumentation to cultivate change from the inside or as 
a feminist engaged in a deeper, more fundamental critical analysis from the outside 
in rejection of the existing framework, guilt may follow. The risk of legitimising 
and propping up systems of oppression as they coopt social justice movements on 
the one hand, or giving up on the victories of past feminisms and being rendered 
irrelevant, on the other hand, can produce paralysis. Whether feminists choose com-
plicity or resistance they are held hostage to the feasibility constraints of the existing 
oppressive conditions maintained by governance institutions. The continual process 
Radin posits of deciding and redeciding which is the least bad option goes some 
way in ensuring humility in framing situated knowledges. By fostering the perspec-
tives of the oppressed through the inroads that feminisms have already produced we 
can speed up transformation, drawing closer to ideals, and dissolving the oppressive 
bind more quickly. Crucially, feminist ideal theorising is to be centred within such 
argumentation structures and I have offered one possible way to think about devel-
oping evaluative principles for advancing nonideal realities.
This may not be “a time when injury, suffering, indignity, symbolic, material vio-
lence, injustice, hunger, poverty are terms that conjure up times gone by” (Anony-
mous in Kouvo and Person [2011] 2014, 218). But a time when we hold our knowl-
edges in suspense, oscillate between nonideal strategies and ideal theorising, when 
we understand and forgive each other and ourselves for the risks we inevitably take 
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in our nonideal world, seek out plurality of perspectives and resist assimilating our 
identities within the mainstream, which looks like an increasingly beautiful and cha-
otic future for the feminist project in international law.
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